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WHY CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DISCLOSURE VIOLATIONS
WHEN ISSUERS DO NOT TRADE?
MERRITT B. Fox*
Should nontrading issuers that make misstatements face civil
liability? Fairness does not require compensation for the resulting trading
losses. Compensation will reduce the disutility in society arising from
trading risks generated by such misstatements, but the gain is very modest
relative to the cost.
The alternative rationale for civil liability, deterrence, depends on
finding insufficient the ordinary social mechanisms to attain public
regulation compliance: governmentally imposed administrative and criminal
sanctions. The usual "private attorney general" argument that civil suits are
a helpful supplement to the efforts of otherwise overstretched public
enforcement officials is open to challenge. Full enforcement of a rule is not
necessarily optimal and a limited budget allocation may represent a political
decision concerning the enforcement level that is. The Paper considers a
number of answers to this challenge. It also considers other arguments for
civil liability: that private litigation is in fact the natural primary
enforcement mechanism for disclosure rule violations, with public
enforcement being the supplement, that civil liability constitutes an efficient
outsourcing to private agents of work the government wants accomplished,
and that civil liability promotes useful legal innovation. On balance, the
deterrence rationale for civil liability is found to be substantial, but would
be more persuasive if the U.S. system were properly reformed.
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INTRODUCTION
Civil damages liability for securities law periodic disclosure
violations has come under attack, particularly fraud-on-the-market
class-action lawsuits for investor losses incurred in connection with
trading in the secondary market when the issuer has not sold shares.
The main line of attack has been the weakness of the compensatory
rationale for such suits.1 Without a compensatory justification, the
attackers suggest, the availability of this cause of action is hard to
defend given the very substantial use of social resources involved in the
1. See, e.g., ANJAN V. THAKOR ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 5 (2005)
[hereinafter THAKOR, ECONOMIC REALITY], available at http://www.institutefor
legalreform.com/index.php?option=com ilr docs&issuecode=SLI&doctype =STU&
itemid=29 (critiquing fraud-on-the-market class-action lawsuits because of the
weakness of the compensation rationale); ANJAN V. THAKOR, THE UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF SECURITIES LITIGATION 14 (2005) [hereinafter THAKOR, UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES], available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/index.php?option
=corn ilr docs&issuecode =SLI&doctype=STU&itemid=29 (same); INTERIM
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 5, 72, 81-82, 109-10
(Nov. 30, 2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee
-Interim ReportREV2.pdf (pointing out reforms which effectively would significantly
reduce such actions, and arguing that these reforms should be undertaken because the
cost of such suits hurts the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets and that the
compensatory justification for them is small); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming
the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 1534, 1556-66, 1585-86 (2006) (critiquing such actions because of
the inadequacy of the compensation rationale); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping
Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARz. L. REv. 639, 646-47 (1996)
(same); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal
Markets, 78 VA. L. REv. 623, 625-26, 632 (1992) (same).
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litigation that it generates. The critics are right concerning the weakness
of the compensatory justification for civil liability. They ignore,
however, a second potential justification: deterrence.2
This Paper considers the deterrence justification for civil liability.
The basic question is whether civil liability should provide at least part
of the system of incentives for compliance with securities-law periodic
disclosure rules, or whether reliance solely on governmentally imposed
administrative and criminal sanctions would be better. In most areas of
public regulation, enforcement is solely governmental. There are
exceptions, however, where government enforcement is supplemented
by civil liability. Antitrust, consumer law, environmental law, and
governmental procurement fraud prevention are prominent examples in
the United States. From a social-policy perspective, is it desirable to
include securities disclosure regulation among these exceptions?3 The
analysis here should usefully inform both the ongoing debate
concerning securities class-action-lawsuit reform in the United States
and discussions abroad concerning increasing the use of civil liability in
other countries.'
2. There are exceptions. Professor Rose considers the advantages and
disadvantages of relying, at least in part, on civil litigation to deter issuer misstatements
in furtherance of a proposal that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
supervise such suits. Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Liigation Reform:
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule lob-5,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1306-07 (2008). Professor Arlen considers issuer liability
primarily as a device to deter issuers from failing to report disclosure violations by their
agents to governmental officials, and wishes authorities to be able to immunize
cooperating issuers from such liability. Jennifer Arlen, Public Versus Private
Enforcement of Securities Fraud 2-5 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
This Paper avoids the issue of whether the SEC can reliably play the screening roles
contemplated by Professors Rose and Arlen. It instead starts with the assumption that if
a country chooses to have civil liability, the system will operate independently of public
enforcement, and asks whether, at least under this assumption, having civil liability is
in fact worthwhile.
3. There is no explicit private right of action provided in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") for violations of section 10(b), under which
the Securities and Exchange Commission Rule ("Rule") lOb-5 was promulgated.
Fraud-on-the-market lawsuits rely on the earlier established theory that violations of
Rule lob-5 give rise to an implied right of action. See Superintendent of Ins. of N. Y.
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971). The discussion here
addresses the policy question of whether it is desirable to have civil liability to help
enforce public regulation in the form of mandatory disclosure. It is not concerned with
the much debated issue of whether it is proper for the courts to imply such a right of
action, which involves, in addition to this policy question, the issue of the respective
roles of the Congress, the courts and, in this case, administrative agencies as well.
These two issues-of public policy and of allocation of governmental authority-tend to
be conflated in debates in the United States concerning fraud-on-the-market lawsuits.
4. There is a growing literature, applicable across countries, that private
damages lawsuits play a helpful role in enforcing securities disclosure laws. Bernard S.
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Parts I and II motivate the inquiry. Part I explores the
compensatory justification for civil liability and concludes that it is
weak, as the critics of civil liability claim. The same conclusion is
reached with respect to the associated investor-protection rationale for
governmentally sponsored periodic disclosure rules. Part II argues that
there are, however, important corporate-governance and liquidity-
enhancement reasons for having these rules. The social purposes served
by such a regulatory regime having thus been identified, the remainder
of the Paper addresses the desirability of having civil damages liability
provide at least part of the incentives for compliance with such rules.
Parts III and IV critically review various justifications for having
civil liability. Part III considers the "private attorney general" idea that
civil liability is needed to supplement inadequate public-enforcement
budgets. Part IV turns this idea around and explores the enforcement
implications of the argument that mandatory disclosure is simply a
corrective for disclosure-level shortfalls in what would otherwise be
privately negotiated and enforced contractual arrangements concerning
disclosure between shareholders and management. Under this view,
private litigation can be justified as the natural primary enforcement
mechanism, with public enforcement being the supplement. Part V
explores the idea that civil liability constitutes an efficient outsourcing
to private agents of work the government wants accomplished. Part VI
considers the idea that civil liability is needed to promote socially useful
legal innovation.
This Paper concludes that there are substantial reasons for using
some kind of civil-liability scheme as at least part of the enforcement
mechanism for mandatory disclosure regulations.
Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48
UCLA L. REV. 781, 796 (2001); Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities
Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 1-2 (2006) (conducting an empirical study finding a relationship
between the availability of private enforcement of securities laws and capital-market
development); Katharina Pistor et al., Law & Finance in Transition Economies, 8
ECON. OF TRANSITION 325, 326-28 (2000); Arlen, supra note 2, at 1-2; Erik Bergl6f &
Stijn Claessens, Enforcement and Corporate Governance, (World Bank Pol'y Research,
Working Paper No. 3409, 2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=625286. Actions by Canada and some countries in Europe
suggest at least some movement toward making securities actions based on issuer
disclosure violations more effectively available. See INT'L FIN. L. REv., GUIDE TO THE
WORLD'S LEADING CAPITAL MARKETS LAWYERS 28-30 (5th ed. 2006), available at
http://www.goodmans.ca/pdfs/Article%20 %20Canada%2OIntroduces%20Securities %2
ODisclosure%2OLiability.pdf; Stefano M. Grace, Strengthening Investor Confidence in
Europe: US.-Style Securities Class Actions and the Acquis Communautaire, 15 J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. & POL. 281, 290-97 (2006); Peter Geier, A Wary Europe Moves a
Step Closer to Class Actions, LAW.COM, Dec. 5, 2006, http://www.law.coml
jsp/article.jsp?id = 1165244464820#.
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I. THE WEAKNESS OF THE COMPENSATORY JUSTIFICATION
Suppose an issuer not offering securities violates applicable
periodic disclosure rules by making a material misstatement that inflates
its share price. Consider the persons who purchase the issuer's shares
in secondary trading during the period between the time of the violation
and the time at which the market realizes the truth. These investors pay
more than they otherwise would have but for the violation. The
argument that there is a social gain in providing compensation for these
losses, however, is weak.
A. Fairness Arguments
One argument for providing compensation is fairness. Disclosure
violations, however, work no systematic unfairness among outside
investors as traders. Traders in the secondary market are no better off
on an expected basis transacting in the shares of an issuer that complies
with periodic disclosure regulations than in the shares of a
noncomplying one. If a falsely positive disclosure violation increases an
issuer's share price by $5, every buyer pays $5 more per share than if
there had been no violation. But every seller receives $5 more per
share. For every share traded, the buyer's loss because of the violation
is exactly counterbalanced by the seller's gain. More generally, the
overall effect of a disclosure violation on investors trading in the
secondary market is a zero-sum game: the winners' winnings just equal
the losers' losses. Each winner and loser is in her position purely by
reason of chance. The expected impact on an investor from trading in
shares of an issuer that, from time to time makes price-inflating
misstatements, is therefore zero.5
5. This statement needs refinement in the case of the buy-and-hold investor.
Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 232 (2007).
Professor Evans posits for purposes of illustration the extreme case of the buy-and-hold
investor who holds her shares for the life of the company and never sells. This investor
faces the downside risk of buying at a misstatement-inflated price at the time of
purchase, but not the upside risk of selling at a misstatement-inflated price. Id. Evans's
observation reflects the larger point that an investor's returns on a share that she
purchases are determined by a combination of the dividends and other distributions that
she receives while holding the share and her proceeds, if any, from its sale at the end of
her holding period. However, this point does not properly lead to the conclusion that
there is, on an expected basis, any unfairness. In a world where there were no such
misstatements, an issuer's share prices in an efficient market would be an unbiased
estimate of the issuer's future dividends and distributions discounted to present value.
In the real world, however, at any given point in time, the managers of some issuers
are making falsely optimistic statements. Investors are aware of this fact, but they do
not know, at least for sure, which managers are truthful and which are making
misstatements. Therefore, all stock prices are discounted to one extent or another to
302
2009:297 Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations 303
It might be argued that it is still unfair ex post when the investor in
fact turns out to be a loser, even if there is no unfairness ex ante. The
losing investor is, after all, innocent, and the loss would not have
occurred but for the wrongdoing of others. Issuer civil liability does not
provide a satisfactory way of curing this ex post unfairness, however. If
the losers have a cause of action against the issuer, it will ultimately be
paid for by the shareholders at the time the suit is brought, thereby
passing on the ex post losses from one innocent chance group to
another.6 As has been widely recognized for some time, this means
that, if a regime is in place by which the losers are compensated by
issuers that make misstatements, the damages are in some sense
"circular. "'
reflect the possibility of untruthfulness. Unless market prices systematically
underestimate the probability of such misstatements, the prices that the investor pays on
average correctly reflect the possibility that they have been inflated by such a
misstatement. The expected cost from purchasing a share that turns out to be inflated is
exactly counterbalanced by the expected gain from buying, at a discount, a share that
turns out not to be inflated.
6. Professor Mitchell argues in this same Symposium issue that the
shareholders of the issuer are in fact not innocent because the misstatement was made
by managers whom the shareholders elected and failed to adequately monitor.
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The "Innocent Shareholder": An Essay on Compensation and
Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 243, 287-90.
Innocence is in the eye of the beholder, however. Most commentators, including
myself, would probably not think that each of the dispersed shareholders of the typical
U.S. issuer has a moral obligation to become informed as to the qualities and behavior
of the issuer's managers and that as a result the shareholder gets what she deserves
when the issuer's shareholders, as a group, fail to do so. From my perspective,
Mitchell's underlying argument really rests on deterrence, not fairness. Imposing
liability on the issuer for a violation of the securities laws when a manager makes a
misstatement deters such behavior in just the same way as imposing liability on the
issuer when a manager decides to violate any other rule, for example by illegally
emitting noxious pollutants into the air. Because, in each case, these losses are
ultimately borne by the shareholders, the same market mechanisms that in general
create incentives for managers to make decisions that enhance share value create
incentives for managers to comply with the law. The question, therefore, is not whether
it is fairer for the shareholders at the time of suit to bear the losses than for the
purchasers who initially incurred the losses to do so. The question is whether imposing
these losses on the shareholders is an appropriate, cost-effective way of improving
compliance with securities-law rules against misstatements.
7. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 1556-66; Mahoney, supra note 1, at
632, 635. Both Professors Coffee and Mahoney express skepticism concerning the
compensation rationale for civil liability imposed on issuers to provide damages to those
who trade in the secondary market at disadvantageous prices due to issuer
misstatements. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has used this idea of damage
circularity as a key element in its recent attack on class-action fraud-on-the-market
litigation. See, e.g., THAKOR, ECONOMIC REALITY, supra note 1, at 4-5; THAKOR,
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 1, at 8-9.
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B. Risk-Reallocation Arguments
There is another argument for requiring aii issuer to compensate
traders who suffer losses from purchasing the issuer's shares at
misstatement-inflated prices: reducing the amount of disutility in society
arising from the risk of suffering such a loss. Close examination
suggests that providing compensation will in fact have this effect to a
limited extent. Compared, however, to the alternative way of dealing
with this risk-investor diversification-compensation is less effective
and far more expensive.
1. COMPENSATION UNLIKELY TO SHIFT LOSSES TO MORE
DIVERSIFIED PERSONS
Because an action against the issuer will ultimately be paid for by
the shareholders at the time the suit is brought, the losses from one
chance group are just passed on to another, as discussed above. Putting
aside insurance for a moment, the persons who will ultimately bear
these losses-the shareholders at the time suit is brought-are unlikely
to be any more diversified than the persons who initially incur them.8
Compensation ultimately paid for by issuer shareholders is thus not
going to reduce the amount of risk-related disutility in society by
having more diversified persons ultimately bear the losses.
2. COMPENSATION LIKELY TO INCREASE LOSS SPREADING
Through loss spreading, compensation can, however, somewhat
reduce the amount of disutility in society arising from the risks of loss
created by issuer misstatements. During any period when the price was
inflated, some, and perhaps many, of the issuer's outstanding shares
will be traded at least once. In all likelihood, not all the outstanding
shares will be traded, however, because some shares held by persons
prior to the misstatement will still be held by the same person at the
time of the suit. If the issuer compensates the purchasers' losses from
the shares that are traded, these losses are spread among the holders of
all the issuer's shares, which, because some of the issuer's shares were
8. Indeed, much of the trading volume in most shares is undertaken by
relatively diversified investment funds that buy and sell shares of the same issuer
relatively frequently. Thus, the average purchaser of shares at prices inflated by
misstatements is probably more diversified than the average of shareholders as a whole,
a group that is likely to include, as well, individual shareholders, who are both less
diversified and trade less frequently.
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not traded, is a larger group.9 Putting aside insurance again, the extent
to which each dollar of compensation spreads the loss is often very
modest, however. In the typical case, the rate of share turnover in the
issuer's shares is sufficiently high and the period of time that the
misstatement inflates price is sufficiently long such that a substantial
portion of all the shares outstanding are purchased by someone at least
once at the inflated price.'" So, the number of persons ultimately
bearing the losses may not be much greater than those suffering the
losses in the first instance."
3. THE EFFECT OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS INSURANCE
Most securities class-action settlements, other than the very large
ones, are funded in total or in substantial part by proceeds from the
directors and officers (D&O) insurance policies purchased by the
issuer.' 2 For the portion of any settlement so funded, the loss-spreading
9. At the time suit is brought, some of the issuer's shareholders have held
their shares since prior to the issuer's misstatement, and so suffered no trading loss as a
result of the misstatement because they neither bought nor sold at a price influenced by
the misstatement. Thus, not all of the issuer's shares were traded at a disadvantageous
price due to the misstatement. As a result, providing damages will spread the losses
from the persons who did engage in such disadvantageous trades across the holders of
all the outstanding shares, which is larger in number than the number of shares traded
at a disadvantageous price.
10. Turnover for an issuer's shares in a given period is the number of shares
traded in the period divided by the total number of the issuer's shares outstanding. In
2005, the annual turnover of the average New York Stock Exchange issuer was 103
percent. Nyxdata.com, NYSE Overview Statistics, http://www.nyxdata.com/factbook
(last visited Feb. 11, 2009). Assuming 250 trading days per year, this implies a
turnover of 0.42 percent per day. This means that for the average issuer, 99.58 percent
of the outstanding shares do not trade each day. The percentage of shares that do not
trade in any given period is thus 0.9958 raised to the power of the number of trading
days in the period. Thus, in six months, 59.69 percent would not have traded at least
once, and 40.31 percent would have traded. In two years, 12.69 percent would not
have traded at least once and 87.31 percent would have. In four years, the
corresponding figures are 1.61 percent and 98.39 percent. Casual empiricism suggests
that in the vast majority of fraud-on-the-market class-action lawsuits, the class period,
which normally corresponds to the length of the claimed period of price inflation, runs
from between six months to two years. Of the 688 securities class actions filed from
2002 to 2008 that have settled or been dismissed, the class period has averaged about
1.5 years. NERA Economic Consulting, http://www.nera.com (proprietary database on
securities class actions).
11. Based on the figures supra note 10, in the average case, to the extent that
losses are not covered by D&O insurance policies, there is barely any loss spreading at
all; losses suffered in connection with trades involving approximately 79 percent of the
shares would be spread over the holders of 100 percent of the shares.
12. See generally Brian R. Cheff'ms & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director
Liability Across Countries, 84 TEx. L. REv. 1385 (2006).
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effect of compensation would, in fact, be very extensive. But the
amount paid out in settlements funded in this fashion represents only a
small portion of all the claimed trading losses that become the subject
of litigation. 13 Moreover, the very large settlements, though few in
number, represent a substantial portion of all the dollars paid out in
settlements, and these very large settlements are primarily funded by
the issuers themselves, not by insurance.14
4. COSTS OF PROVIDING LIMITED LOSS SPREADING AND THE
ALTERNATIVE OF SHAREHOLDER DIVERSIFICATION
Compensation's capacity to reduce the disutility in society arising
from trading risks generated by issuer misstatements must be weighed
against the high transaction costs associated with providing this
compensation, and must be compared to the alternative ways of
reducing this disutility.
a. Costs ofproviding compensation through securities litigation
In recent years in the United States, the lawyers' fees on the two
sides of securities litigation have alone, in the aggregate, averaged
about $2.5 billion per year.15 On top of this is the cost of experts, the
time and attention of issuers' executives required by litigation, the
13. See generally THAKOR, ECONOMIC REALITY, supra note 1.
14. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2008: A
YEAR N REVIEW (2009), available at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/YIR
2008.pdf.
15. For the years 2000-05, total annual securities class-action settlements
have averaged about $4.1 billion. LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, POST-
REFORM ACT SECURITIES SETTLEMENTS: 2005 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS (2006), available
at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/Settlements20OS.pdf. Studies suggest that
contingent-fee awards to plaintiffs' lawyers in securities class-action lawsuits average
around 30 percent. FREDERICK C. DUNBAR & VINITA M. JUNEJA, RECENT TRENDS II:
WHAT ExPLAINs SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS?., at tbl.4 (1993)
(reporting that attorneys' fees averaged 31.32 percent of settlements in a sample of 135
cases from July 1991 through June 1993); FREDERICK C. DUNBAR ET AL., RECENT
TRENDS III: WHAT EXPLAINS SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS?, at ii
(1995) (reporting that although average settlements fell from 1993 to 1994, plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees stayed constant, averaging one-third of the settlement awards, and that
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees averaged "$1.96 million in 1993 and $2.03 million in 1994").
If we assume that defendants' lawyers are paid fees comparable in amount, this would
suggest that the total annual legal expenses associated with these actions averaged about
$2.5 billion ((0.30 + 0.30) x $4.1 billion). The plaintiffs' expenses come out of the
judgment or settlement and hence diminish what would otherwise be paid to members
of the class. The issuer defendant's expenses are ultimately borne by its shareholders at
the time suit is brought.
306
2009:297 Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations
administrative costs associated with D&O insurance, and the use of
scarce judicial resources.
These transaction costs, including the $2.5 billion in legal fees, are
real costs to society. They need to be weighed against the real gains to
society from a wealth transfer that simply spreads more broadly $2.9
billion in losses.' 6 These figures suggest, just on their face, that
securities litigation is so costly, relative to the amount of loss spreading
achieved, that it is unlikely to be worthwhile even if there were no
alternative way of reducing the social disutility arising from the risks of
issuer misstatements.
b. Diversification as an alternative
There is, however, an alternative, much more economical and
effective way of reducing these risks: investor diversification. Many
investors already have some or most of their equity investments in
broadly based investment vehicles, such as index or mutual funds or
broad-based 401(k) retirement accounts, or are otherwise highly
diversified. For an investor directly or indirectly holding a diversified
set of stocks, no risk reduction is achieved by shifting the misstatement-
induced trading losses from purchases of the stocks making up the set
to the issuers that made the misstatements. This is because, as set out
below, the practice of issuers making misstatements imposes no
significant risks in the first place on the holder of this set of stocks.
A broadly diversified investment portfolio is divided among
hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of different stocks. At the time that
the purchase of each of these stocks is made, there is a certain, fairly
small percentage chance that the price has been inflated by the issuer
having made a misstatement. The market is aware of this possibility and
discounts the price of the stock to reflect its estimate of the chance of a
misstatement and the expected inflation in price if there is one. The
investor is like a fire-insurance company that gathers a large number of
homeowners, each of whose home has a small percentage risk of
burning down that is independent of the risk of any other policy
holder's home burning down. In return for a fee, the insurance
company agrees to absorb the full cost of a fire in any of the homes.
Because of the law of large numbers, each year the insurance company
will experience a fairly steady level of aggregate payouts on its
policies. These payouts are covered by the fee, if set at the right level,
16. Based on the figures supra note 15, for the years 2000-05, the total annual
securities class-action settlements have averaged about $4.1 billion, from which
plaintiffs' lawyers are paid about $1.2 billion in contingent fees. This leaves about $2.9
billion to be distributed as compensation to cover the trading losses of the plaintiffs.
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that it collects for issuing the policies. For the investor, the discount it
receives in terms of the price of each stock is like the fee the insurance
company collects from the homeowners. In an efficient market, the
market's estimate of the chance that an issuer will make a misstatement
and of the resulting inflated effect on share price will be unbiased in the
sense that it will not consistently be too large or too small. So, the
discount will, on average, in fact be at the right level.
Assume for a moment that at each point in time, any errors in
these estimates for any given issuer are independent of the errors in the
estimates for all the other issuers in the market. In such a world, the
errors, again because of the law of large numbers, will tend to cancel
each other out. Therefore, each year, the aggregate losses that the
investor suffers from purchasing stocks that were in fact inflated by an
issuer misstatement will, like with the fire-insurance company, be fairly
steady and covered by the discount she receives on the price of all the
stocks she purchased that were not inflated in price by a misstatement. 7
Thus, even without compensation, the investor faces no significant
losses on a net basis from the fact that some issuers made price-
inflating misstatements. Using securities litigation to shift losses arising
from the misstatements of individual issuers to the issuers involves real
social costs, with no gain in the form of reduced risk.
This assumption that, at any one point in time, the errors in the
estimates with regard to any one issuer are independent of the estimates
with regard to the others is almost certainly not entirely accurate. The
market, at any one point in time, may under- or overestimate the extent
to which issuers across the market are engaging in misstatements. We
appear to have observed, for example, a negative market-wide impact
from the series of scandals in the early 2000s of which WorldCom and
Enron were the most prominent. The revelation of misstatements by the
issuers involved in the scandals seems to have led to a market
reevaluation of its estimates concerning the risks that other issuers were
making price-inflating misstatements as well. To the extent, however,
that the assumption deviates from reality, the case for securities
17. Even if the number of stocks held is not so large that the outcomes
(purchasing the stock of a truthful company at a discount versus purchasing the stock of
an untruthful company that results in a loss) cannot be expected to perfectly cancel each
other out, the remaining risk associated with issuer misstatements is just one of many
different risks associated with investing in each stock in the investor's portfolio. Most
of these other risks will be independent of the remaining risk associated with issuer
misstatements and so, with diversification, will tend to cancel out this remaining risk.
To the extent that losses are compensated through civil liability, the discount for
these losses will be reduced. Substituting for this reduction, however, will be a discount
for the fact that each issuer faces a certain percentage chance of having to pay out such
compensation.
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litigation as a way to reduce social disutility from risk is no stronger.
The correlated error in the discount is a systematic risk, the disutility
from which cannot be eliminated by shifting it around.
c. Investors who are not broadly diversified
Not all investors are broadly diversified, of course. Shifting such
investors' trading losses to issuer shareholders will reduce their risks.
And, as noted above, to the extent that this shift spreads these losses
among a larger group of persons, it will reduce on a net basis the total
amount of disutility in society from risks generated by issuers making
price-inflating misstatements. Raising fairness again, but in a more
refined way than before, one might argue that compensation should be
paid as a simple matter of corrective justice. These undiversified
investors, the argument would run, should not be forced to absorb risks
created by the misdeeds of others just because the investors suffering
losses did not protect themselves through diversification. 8
The problem with this more refined fairness argument is that the
very substantial transaction costs associated with providing this
compensation are not borne primarily by the managers of the issuers
making the misstatements, who are the persons actually committing the
misdeeds. The costs are borne by an issuer's shareholders over time.
Broadly diversified investors will constitute a substantial portion of
these shareholders. One can therefore reverse the argument and say that
it is unfair to impose pro rata on this broadly diversified portion of an
issuer's shareholders these very substantial costs when they gain no
risk-reduction benefit because they are already protected. Ultimately,
therefore, fairness concerns are not helpful in resolving the issue, and
the question comes back to what is the lowest-cost and most effective
way to eliminate risk. Each investor, through her ability to diversify
broadly, is the least-cost avoider of disutility arising from the risks
generated by price-inflating issuer misstatements.
C The Investor-Protection Rationale for Securities Disclosure Rules
Closely related to these discussions of fairness and risk is the
proposition that the investor-protection rationale for securities
disclosure rules is also weak (in contrast to the corporate-governance
and liquidity rationales). Many provisions in the securities laws,
including parts of broker-dealer regulation, have important fairness
purposes. Fairness is not, however, a persuasive rationale for the
disclosure regulation of established issuers trading in efficient markets.
18. See Evans, supra note 5, at 235-36.
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Disclosure by such issuers is not necessary to protect investors against
either unfair prices or risk.' 9 According to the efficient-market
hypothesis, the price of such a share is unbiased-as likely to be below
the share's actual value as above-whether there is a great deal of
information publicly available about the issuer or very little. In other
words, greater disclosure is not necessary to protect investors from
buying its shares at prices that are, on average, unfair-that is, greater
than their actual values. Issuer disclosure may reduce risk, on average
bringing prices closer, on one side or the other, to actual value, but the
only kind of risk that it reduces is unsystematic risk. Simply by being
diversified, investors can protect themselves from this unsystematic risk
much more effectively and at less social cost than by increases in issuer
disclosure.
II. THE POTENTIAL FOR A DETERRENCE JUSTIFICATION
Given the weakness of the compensatory justification for civil
liability when nontrading issuers violate periodic disclosure regulations,
is deterrence a potential alternative justification for a system of civil
liability? The first step in answering this question is to identify what,
given the problems with the investor-protection rationale for mandatory
disclosure, the societal function served by a governmentally sponsored
periodic disclosure regime is. As developed below, issuer disclosure
can enhance efficiency by improving corporate governance and
increasing liquidity. Without a governmentally sponsored periodic
disclosure regime, however, issuer disclosure is likely to be at a
socially suboptimal level. The societal function for a governmentally
sponsored disclosure regime having been identified, the stage is set to
address the question to which the rest of the Paper is devoted: whether,
given this social function, the deterrence effects of civil liability make a
damages cause of action socially worthwhile. In essence, this is the
question of whether civil-damages-liability based incentives for
compliance with the governmentally sponsored periodic disclosure
regime are likely to be worth their costs.
A. Issuer Disclosure's Role in Improving Corporate Governance
and Liquidity
Disclosure enhances efficiency by improving the selection of
proposed new investment projects in the economy and the operation of
19. I have considered the points discussed here in significantly more detail
elsewhere. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who
Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2498, 2532-44 (1997).
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existing projects. A corporation is well governed if it makes these
decisions in share-value-maximizing ways. Disclosure prompts
managers of established corporations to make share-value-maximizing
decisions through its beneficial effects on the workings of both the legal
mechanisms for assuring quality of corporate governance and the
existing market mechanisms that help align managerial interests with
those of shareholders. Disclosure also enhances efficiency by increasing
the liquidity of an issuer's stock through the reduction in the bid/ask
spread demanded by the makers of the markets for these shares.
1. LEGAL MECHANISMS
Disclosure strengthens the effective exercise of the shareholder
franchise because a better-informed shareholder is more likely to vote
for the directors who in fact are most likely to maximize share value, as
well as for the share-value-maximizing choice with regard to all other
matters subject to shareholder vote. Disclosure also enhances effective
derivative-suit enforcement of management's fiduciary duties because
managers are unlikely to voluntarily provide information concerning
their breaches of these duties. And, by making the existence of such
conflicts more easily detected, it makes more meaningful corporate-law
provisions requiring special procedures in connection with the
authorization of transactions in which management has an interest.
2. MARKET MECHANISMS
Disclosure has beneficial effects on the operation of three of the
economy's key market-based mechanisms for controlling managerial
behavior: the market for corporate control, share-price-based
managerial compensation, and the terms at which new funding is
available to the corporation.
a. Market for corporate control
Disclosure strengthens the effectiveness of the market for
corporate control by increasing the threat of hostile takeover when
managers act in a non-share-value-maximizing way. A potential
acquirer must make an inherently risky assessment of what a target
would be worth in its hands. Greater disclosure reduces the riskiness of
this assessment. Because the potential acquirer's management is risk
averse, this reduction in the riskiness of its assessment means that a
smaller apparent deviation between incumbent management decision
making and what would maximize share value is then needed to impel
the potential acquirer into action. This reduction in the size of the
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
apparent deviation needed to impel action, by increasing the threat of
takeover, better motivates incumbent managers to maximize share
value. For those who fail nevertheless to do so, it increases the
likelihood of the manager's replacement.
b. Share-price-based compensation
Disclosure strengthens the usefulness of share-price-based
compensation as a way of motivating management by inducing
management to accept a larger portion of its total compensation in
share-price-based form. The problem for managers with share-price-
based compensation, compared to straight salary with the same
expected value, is the undiversifiable unsystematic risk that it imposes
on the manager. More disclosure makes share prices more accurate,
which reduces this unsystematic risk. More accurate share prices also
make such compensation a more focused reward mechanism.
c. Terms of funding new projects
Disclosure, by improving share-price accuracy, also improves the
allocation of scarce capital among the proposed real investment projects
in the economy. This is clearest when a firm is considering funding a
project through the issuance of new equity. Disclosure affects the terms
at which such funds can be obtained. An inaccurately high price may
encourage managers to invest in negative net-present-value projects,
that is, to invest in projects with prospects inferior to the prospects of
some proposed projects in the economy that do not get funding. An
inaccurately low price may discourage investments in positive net-
present-value projects, that is, to pass up projects with prospects better
than some project proposals in the economy that do get funding. There
is evidence that share price affects the terms demanded by other
available external sources of funds as well." ° Share price also appears to
affect management's willingness to use internal funds to implement a
new project.2"
3. LIQUIDITY
More disclosure reduces illiquidity in the secondary market for an
issuer's shares. Insiders and their tippees can make supranormal profits
by engaging in trades based on nonpublic information. Since market
20. See HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION
IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 123 (1979).
21. See MERRrrr B. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A
DYNAMIC ECONOMY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 282-87 (1987).
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makers and specialists have difficulty knowing whether they are dealing
with such inside-information-informed traders or with uninformed
outsiders, they cover the expected costs of being on the other side of
trades with informed traders through the bid/ask spread they offer all
traders, that is, the difference between the price at which they accept
buyer orders and the price at which they accept seller orders." The
bigger the spread, the less liquid the issuer's shares, and the less
valuable they are to hold. Ongoing periodic disclosure, by reducing the
amount of nonpublic information and hence the opportunities for
insiders and tippees to engage in trades based on such information,
reduces bid/ask spreads, increases liquidity, and, as a consequence,
reduces the cost of capital.23
B. The Social Function of a Governmentally Sponsored Disclosure
Regime
The fact that issuer disclosure enhances efficiency by improving
corporate governance and increasing liquidity does not, by itself, show
the need for a governmentally sponsored disclosure regime. Even
without governmental regulation, market forces encourage issuers to
provide a certain level of disclosure. Disclosure has costs as well as
benefits, and so for each issuer there is some socially optimal level of
disclosure. A governmentally sponsored periodic disclosure regime
only serves a useful social purpose if, on average, it prompts a
country's issuers to disclose closer to this level than they would if
society relied on market forces alone.2 4
22. See generally LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET
MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 287-91, 299-302 (2003); Lawrence R. Glosten
& Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with
Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985).
23. For models working these points out more rigorously, see generally
Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 97 (2001) (noting
that disclosure reduces information asymmetries and lowers a firm's cost of capital);
Maureen O'Hara & David Easley, Information and the Cost of Capital (Nov. 2001)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id= 300715&high = %20maureen%20ohara (same).
24. This is a question that has given rise to much scholarly debate. Scholarly
opposition to the U.S. mandatory disclosure regime began with empirical work by
certain economists purporting to show that it had no benefit. See, e.g., George J.
Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 132, 149, 153 (1973); George J. Stigler,
Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117, 122-24 (1964).
Signaling-the idea that issuers with good news will want to disclose it and that the
market will infer from the silence of the rest that they do not have good news-added a
theoretical component to the case against mandatory disclosure. See Steven A. Ross,
Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets" Implications of Modem Finance Theory
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A governmentally sponsored disclosure regime could take one of
two forms. One, existing largely only in the eyes of its academic
proponents, is an "issuer choice" regime.25 Under this approach, an
issuer is not bound by a jurisdiction's disclosure rules unless it so
chooses. Choosing a jurisdiction by which to be bound is a method of
bonding to assure investors that the issuer will provide, long term, the
level of disclosure required by the jurisdiction's rules. The other form
is the traditional governmentally sponsored periodic disclosure regime,
found around the world, where the rules are mandatorily applicable to a
defined set of issuers, such as all issuers whose securities trade in the
jurisdiction's markets or all publicly traded issuers that are nationals of
the jurisdiction. The important point for the discussion here, however,
is that each form, to be effective, requires incentives for compliance.
So the question of the desirability of civil liability is relevant to both,
though it potentially serves additional functions in the case of
mandatory disclosure.
There are two discrete sets of reasons why it may be desirable to
have a set of governmentally generated periodic disclosure rules. One
set arises out of the role of disclosure, discussed above, in reducing the
agency costs of management and market illiquidity, reasons applicable
to both issuer choice regimes and mandatory ones. The other set relates
to the market failure that arises because the social costs of an issuer's
disclosure are lower than its private costs, and the social benefits of its
disclosure are greater than its private benefits, reasons only applicable
to mandatory regimes.
and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177, 182 (Franklin R.
Edwards ed., 1979). Despite their challenges, however, most law-and-economics-
oriented scholars concluded, based on market-failure theories, that on balance the U.S.
system should be retained. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 725-28
(1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 684-85 (1984). In the late 1990s, the
issue was raised again in a somewhat different form by scholars arguing that issuers
should be able to avoid the U.S. regime if they chose instead the regime of any of the
fifty states or any foreign country. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable
Reciprocity. Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L.
REv. 903, 921-24 (1998); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2361-62 (1998). For
arguments that this issuer choice approach is undesirable, see Merritt B. Fox, Retaining
Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85
VA. L. REv. 1335 (1999).
25. See, e.g., Choi & Guzman, supra note 24, at 907; Romano, supra note
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1. AGENCY COSTS OF MANAGEMENT AND MARKET ILLIQUIDITY
The fact that an issuer's managers are in an agency relationship
with its shareholders gives rise to a divergence between the manager's
optimal level of disclosure at any given point in time and what is
optimal for the issuer's shareholders. As developed above, disclosure,
in addition to enhancing liquidity, increases the effectiveness of a
number of devices that work to limit the ability of managers to deviate,
for their own advantage, from acting in the shareholders' best interests:
the shareholder vote, shareholder enforcement of management's
fiduciary duties, the hostile takeover, and share-price-based
compensation. This increased effectiveness is a cost to managers, who
would prefer to pursue their personal goals under as few constraints as
possible. Managers, of course, may also benefit derivatively from an
increase in share price that reflects increased disclosure's improvements
in managerial discipline and liquidity. The size of this benefit,
however, would in many cases not be sufficient to cancel out the
personal cost to the managers of having to work under greater
discipline.
a. Bonding by means of a disclosure regime to assure shareholders
The level of disclosure that is optimal for the shareholders of a
publicly traded issuer is the one that, to the extent cost effective,
minimizes the deviation between management's decisions and what
would maximize share value. In theory at least, there is a way, without
a traditional mandatory disclosure regime, to assure that the firm will
provide disclosure on an ongoing basis at this optimal level. A firm's
original entrepreneurs can voluntarily commit the issuer at the time of
its initial public offering (IPO) to provide periodic disclosure at this
level in the future. They create this commitment by subjecting the firm
to some kind of ongoing system of binding disclosure rules. The closer
the expected level of future disclosure is to what would be optimal for
the firm's shareholders, the less the market would expect management
decision making to deviate from what is in shareholders' best interests
in the future, and the higher the market price for the issuer's IPO.
Because a higher price means that the firm will need to sell fewer
shares in the IPO to obtain a given amount of financing,26 and because
26. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24, at 684. The idea that
entrepreneurs have an incentive to obligate the firm to comply with a disclosure regime
that maximizes share value is an application of the larger principle, set out in Jensen
and Meckling's seminal article, that firms that go public will contract with shareholders
to provide the agency-cost-minimizing set of constraints on management. See generally
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the entrepreneurs typically retain the issuer's remaining shares, the
entrepreneurs capture this price improvement through a dollar-for-
dollar increase in the size of their entrepreneurial surplus. They would
therefore have an incentive to commit the issuer to disclose at the level
that is in the issuer shareholders' best interests.
Subjecting the issuer to a governmentally sponsored disclosure
regime is one way of assuring the purchasers of the shares that the
issuer will provide this higher level of disclosure on an ongoing basis.
This is the idea behind the issuer choice approach to disclosure
regulation. A traditional mandatory regime, if it requires the right level
of disclosure, will have the same result. Alternatively, the firm could
try to bind itself through some kind of private rule-generating regime,
for example by listing on a stock exchange with certain disclosure
requirements. The governmentally based regime may, however, have
the advantages of offering, as at least a partial enforcement mechanism,
governmental investigation and prosecution of possible violations. The
full power of the state can aid this mechanism through issuing
subpoenas to acquire evidence and imprisonment for established
violations.
b. Possible need for a mandatory regime
This internalization of the benefits from the disciplinary effects of
disclosure will not be complete unless the market is confident at the
time of the IPO that the issuer is fully committed to credibly disclose at
the promised level for the life of the firm. It is probably impractical to
institute a voluntary-commitment mechanism on the part of the issuer
that provides such an ironclad guarantee. No voluntarily chosen
institution providing enforcement and rule-making services can,
whether private or public, be relied upon over the remaining life of the
firm to continue to maintain the same rules. Even if one could, there
would be a value in providing some kind of room for the firm to opt
out later, in the event that the standards imposed by the institution no
longer fit the firm well. Yet, the same opt-out provision would provide
the opportunity for managerial opportunism. Thus, a mandatory regime
of governmentally generated rules may be required to provide a regime
that is essentially inescapable as long as the issuer stays public, but that
has the flexibility to change the rules based on changing circumstances
and new learning.
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FiN. EcoN. 305 (1976).
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2. PRIVATE VERSUS SOCIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN
ISSUER'S DISCLOSURE
An additional and stronger case for a traditional mandatory
disclosure regime arises from the fact that the social costs of an issuer's
disclosure are lower than its private costs, and the social benefits of its
disclosure are greater than its private benefits, with resulting market
failure.
a. Divergence ofprivate from social costs
For each individual issuer, a disclosure involves two different
kinds of costs, "operational" costs and "interfirm" costs. Operational
costs are the out-of-pocket expenses and the diversions of management
and staff time that issuers incur to provide the information. Interfirm
costs arise from the fact that the information provided can put the issuer
at a disadvantage relative to its competitors, major suppliers, and major
customers. Operational costs are costs both to the individual firm and to
society as a whole. Interfirm costs are costs only to the individual firm.
They are not social costs because the disadvantages to the issuer from
the disclosure are counterbalanced by the advantages it confers on the
other firms. Thus, at all levels of disclosure, an issuer's private
marginal cost of disclosure will exceed its social marginal cost by an
amount equal to these interfirm costs.
b. Divergence ofprivate from social benefits
Information disclosed by one issuer does not just improve its
corporate governance and reduce the illiquidity of its own shares. The
information can be useful in analyzing other issuers as well, and thus
have beneficial effects on their governance and liquidity. It could, for
example, reveal something about possible industry-wide trends.
27 In
particular, if one has detailed information about one issuer's
performance, it is easier to detect shirking by the managers of its
competitors who face a similar external business environment. These
benefits will not be captured in the price of the issuer making the
disclosure, and therefore the private benefit of disclosure to the issuer
and its shareholders will be less than the social benefit.
c. Market-failure justilication for mandatory disclosure
Because an issuer's disclosure involves both social costs and social
benefits, each issuer has some socially optimal level of disclosure.
27. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24, at 685.
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Because the private costs of an issuer's disclosure exceed the social
costs and the private benefits fall short of the social benefits, even
managers who completely identify with existing shareholders-ones
who seek to maximize share value, so that costs of disclosure to the
shareholders are equivalent to costs to the managers-would therefore
choose to bind the firm to a disclosure level below the social
optimum.2" Mandatory disclosure can be viewed, in important part, as
an effort to correct this shortfall. In this connection, it should be noted
that if all issuers are required to increase their disclosures up to the
socially optimal level, the effects of the interfirm costs that give rise to
the divergence between private and social cost would likely be a wash
for each firm. Each firm would lose as a result of its own increased
disclosure, but gain from the disclosures of its competitors, major
suppliers, and major purchasers. At the same time, the higher level of
disclosure would further reduce agency costs of management and
further improve liquidity.
C. Conclusion
Issuer disclosure is not necessary to protect investors from trading
in the market at unfair prices. It does, however, enhance efficiency by
improving corporate governance and increasing liquidity. Without a
governmentally sponsored regime, issuer disclosure is likely to be at a
suboptimal level. The functions of a governmentally sponsored
disclosure regime having been identified, we can now ask the question
addressed in the rest of the Paper: whether civil-damages-liability-based
incentives for compliance with this regime are likely to be worth their
costs. In other words, is there a deterrence-based justification for civil
liability?
III. CIVIL LIABILITY AS A SUPPLEMENT TO
GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT
The most common noncompensatory justification for providing
civil liability damages based on the violation of a public regulation is
28. I have considered in more detail elsewhere the divergence of the private
and social costs and benefits of issuer disclosure and the consequent tendency of issuers
to disclose below their socially optimal level. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure
in a Globalizing Market. Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2537-
39 (1997); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435,
1490-91 (1992); Coffee, supra note 24, at 721-23; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
24, at 684-85; Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure,
61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 846-74 (1995).
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that plaintiffs who bring such civil actions act as "private attorney
generals," who help society by supplementing the efforts of otherwise
overstretched public officials. Indeed, this rationale for civil liability in
the securities law disclosure area has been repeated by the Supreme
Court of the United States multiple times ,29 and endorsed by Congress
in the legislative history of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 (PSLRA), its largest effort to date at securities litigaton
reform.3°
A. Reasons for Initial Skepticism
Absent further elaboration, the argument that civil liability is
needed because the public enforcement agency has inadequate resources
to effectively enforce a given public regulation is unpersuasive. Less
than total enforcement of a rule is not self-evidently inappropriate when
that shortfall occurs as a result of a political process that gives the
enforcement agency a budgetary allocation smaller than what would be
needed for full enforcement.
Many public regulations are drafted in an overly broad fashion in
the sense that it would not be socially worthwhile for them to be
complied with in every circumstance. Even where compliance is
socially worthwhile, once a violation has occurred, the social gain in
terms of deterrence from bringing an action against the violator may
not be worth the social resources consumed by the action. Budgetary
allocations to an enforcement agency are arguably a way that the
legislature can police agency determinations regarding when it is
worthwhile to bring actions.3" Permitting civil damage actions can
undercut this policing and result in social resources-the lawyers' time
29. In connection with finding an implied right of action for violations of the
proxy rules under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, the Court stated:
Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to
[SEC] action. As in antitrust treble damage litigation, the possibility of civil
damages ... serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the
proxy requirements. The [SEC] . . .examines over 2,000 proxy statements
annually .... Time does not permit an independent examination of the
facts set out in the proxy material.
J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
The Court has reiterated this position with respect to Rule lOb-5 actions recently,
saying that it has "long recognized that meritorious private actions to enforce federal
antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil
enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the
[SEC]." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007).
30. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).




and the other transaction costs associated with litigation-being devoted
to actions in amounts greater than is socially worthwhile.
There are several possible responses, however, to this critique of
the private-attorney-general rationale for civil liability, based, in part,
on the particular nature of securities disclosure rules and the ways that
a civil-liability system might be designed with respect to their violation.
B. Properly Designed Civil Liability Will Not Result in
Overenforcement
A properly designed system of civil liability need not inevitably
lead to overenforcement. The issue arises in the mandatory disclosure
area because the civil-liability system as currently designed, with the
dominant role played by fraud-on-the-market class-action lawsuits, can
result in large damage awards that, for the same reasons that the
compensation justification is weak, do not bear a one-to-one relation to
the harm to society caused by the underlying violation.32 Thus, the
cause of action is likely to induce some lawsuits where the social
resources consumed exceed the social benefits. As will be discussed
below, the optimal solution to this problem would involve a redesign of
the current civil-liability system in a way that eliminates, where the
issuer does not trade, issuer liability and the payment of damages to
investors who suffer secondary market trading losses. An alternative,
second-best solution would be to retain these features of the system but
to alter the fee structure for plaintiffs' lawyers who bring such suits.
1. COMPLETE REDESIGN OF THE CIVIL-LIABILITY SYSTEM
The overall system of civil liability for disclosure violations where
the issuer does not trade can be redesigned so that it will deter
disclosure violations at least as well as the current system, but the
damages will bear a much closer relation to the social harm caused by
the violation. With such a transformation, the risk that civil liability
would lead to over enforcement is substantially eliminated.33 I have
32. See A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class
Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 928
(1999).
33. The assumption here is that the deterrent value of a damages judgment is
proportional to the social harm that the injury causes. The standard plaintiffs' lawyer
percentage of recovery would need to be set to achieve the most cost-effective total
level of litigation. See Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring
Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 333 (1982) (discussing both the
relationship between who bears legal fees and the level of litigation and the relevance of
deterrence value in determining the optimal level of litigation). Professor Shavell's
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attempted to design such a system in a related article.34 Under my
proposed scheme, because of the weakness of the compensatory
justification, fraud-on-the-market lawsuits would be eliminated and so
an issuer would not be liable to investors for losses caused by its
disclosure violations as long as it is not itself selling securities.
Deterrence would be achieved by imposing civil liability on actors other
than the issuer. An issuer's annual filings would be signed by an
external certifier: an investment bank or other well-capitalized entity
with financial expertise. If the filing contained a material misstatement
and the certifier failed to do its due diligence, the certifier would face
measured liability to the issuer itself. Officers and directors would be
subject to a similar liability scheme and would not be permitted
indemnification or insurance. Damages owed by each of these parties
would be comparable to the amount for which the party would be liable
today in a claim for contribution by another party that had paid the full
amount of a judgment in a section 11 action under the Securities Act of
1933 in connection with a registered public offering in an amount
equal, roughly, to the issuer's gross investment for the year. Suit could
be brought under this system by any shareholder on behalf of the
corporation in much the same fashion that a shareholder can now bring
a lawsuit to recover for the corporation an insider's short-swing profits
under section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, with attorneys' fees available
for successful plaintiffs.35
2. CALIBRATING THE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY FEE STRUCTURE UNDER
THE EXISTING FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET SYSTEM
Even if there is no such reform and the existing fraud-on-the-
market liability system is maintained, the class-action plaintiffs'
attorney contingency fee, which is typically a percentage of the
damages paid to investors in settlement or at judgment, can be
calibrated so that the level of enforcement is correct at least on average.
The aggregate damages owed investors in a successful fraud-on-the-
market action equals the number of the issuer's outstanding shares that
work in turn builds on some classic articles using economics to analyze public versus
private enforcement of law and the optimal design of civil liability to promote efficient
enforcement. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance,
and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16-17 (1974); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1
(1975); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 105, 106 (1980).
34. Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2009).
35. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1943).
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were purchased at least once during the period at the misstatement-
inflated price, multiplied, for each such share, by the dollar amount by
which the price was inflated at the time of its first purchase.36 While
there is not a one-to-one relation between the amount of these damages
and the social harm caused by the material misstatements that trigger
the suits, they share common determinants that lead to a positive
correlation between the two. This in turn leads to a correlation between
percentage-of-damages-based contingent-fee awards and social harm.
a. A misstatement's impact on market capitalization and its duration as
determinants of fraud-on-the-market damages
(I) IMPACT ON MARKET CAPITALIZATION
The inflating effect of a misstatement on an issuer's market
capitalization at any point in time equals the total number of the issuer's
shares outstanding multiplied by the dollar amount by which the price is
inflated. Stating the same relation slightly differently, per dollar of
price inflation per share, the bigger the absolute dollar effect of the
misstatement on the issuer's market capitalization, the greater the
number of shares outstanding that are implied. For a period of price
inflation of a given length, the larger the number of shares outstanding,
the larger the absolute number of the issuer's shares will be traded at
least once. Thus, for a given length of time before the market realizes
the truth, for firms with an average turnover in share holdings, the total
damages owing to investors in a successful fraud-on-the-market
lawsuit-the number of shares traded at least once during the period
multiplied by the amount of inflation at the time of first purchase-will
36. Damages in fraud-on-the-market lawsuits are calculated in accordance
with the out-of-pocket measure. Under this measure, the amount of damages owed to a
purchaser of a share at a price inflated by a falsely positive misstatement is the amount
by which the share price was inflated at the time of purchase (less, if it was sold prior
to full revelation of the truth, the amount it was inflated at the time of sale). Randall v.
Lofisgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1986); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
541 F.2d 1335, 1341-46 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring); Estate Counseling
Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, 303 F.2d 527, 532-33 (10th Cir. 1962); Louis Loss &
JOEL SEIGMAN, SECutrrTIEs REGULATION 4413-14 (3rd ed. 1998). Thus, for a share
purchased just once during the period of inflation and held until revelation of the truth,
the damages would equal the amount of the inflation at the time of purchase. For a
share that was purchased multiple times during the period, the damages of the multiple
purchasers would, in aggregate, equal the amount of inflation at the time of purchase,
with each purchaser receiving damages equal to the amount, if any, that the price
deflated during her period of holding the share.
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be proportional to the effect of the misstatement on the market
capitalization of the firm. 37
(H) DURATION
Everything being equal, the longer the period before the market
realizes the truth, the greater the number of the firm's outstanding
shares are traded at least once at an inflated price, and hence the greater
the damages.
b. A misstatement s impact on market capitalization and its duration as
determinants of its social harm
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that, for issuers with an
average rate of turnover of share holdings, a greater amount of
damages means that the misstatement has had a larger absolute dollar
effect on the market capitalization of the firm and/or a longer period of
time transpired before the market realized the truth. Each of these
contributors to the size of a firm's damages is positively related to the
amount of social harm caused by the misstatement, both in terms of
poorer corporate governance and decreased liquidity.
37. This point can be illustrated by an example. Imagine two firms, A and B.
On June 1, the management of each makes a misstatement that inflates its firm's shares
by $5 and continues to inflate the price by that amount through August 31. On
September 1, the market discovers the truth with respect to each firm and in each case
the price drops by $5, thereby eliminating all of the inflation caused by the
misstatement. A successful fraud-on-the-market class-action lawsuit is filed on behalf of
all persons who purchased A's shares between June 1 and August 31 and who still held
these shares on September 1. A similar successful action is filed against B. Assume that
total damages in the suit against A are $50 million, and total damages in the suit against
B are $150 million. These total damages figures imply that three times as many of firm
B's outstanding shares were purchased at least once during the three-month period of
inflation than firm A's outstanding shares. If each firm has an average rate of turnover
in the holdings of its shares, this result in turn implies that firm B has three times as
many shares outstanding, and hence the inflating effect of B's management's
misstatement on B's market capitalization is three times as great as well. This result-
that for firms with the same rate of turnover and the same duration before the market
discovers the truth, total damages are proportional to the size of the effect of the
misstatement on the firm's market capitalization-is independent of the amount of
inflation per share. Thus, if the example were changed so that firm B's shares were
instead inflated by $10 per share (with A's shares still being inflated by $5 per share)
but with the damages still being $50 million for firm A and $150 million for firm B, the
implication would be that, while firm B now would have only 1.5 times as many shares
outstanding as A, the inflating effect of B's management's misstatement on its




(I) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMPACT ON MARKET CAPITALIZATION AND
SOCIAL HARM FROM POORER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The size of a misstatement's inflationary impact on an issuer's
capitalization depends on the extent to which the misstatement deviates
from the truth and the size of the issuer's enterprise. Both factors are
also related to the social damage caused by the misstatement.
When a misrepresentation concerning an issuer of a given size
constitutes a larger deviation from the truth, it will have a larger
absolute dollar effect on the issuer's market capitalization. A
misstatement that deviates more from the truth also has a more severe
impact on the issuer's corporate governance because it more greatly
diminishes the effectiveness of the legal and market mechanisms that
help align managerial interests with those of shareholders. Thus, it
causes more social harm.
When an issuer is larger, a misstatement constituting a given
deviation from the truth would also have a greater absolute dollar effect
on the issuer's capitalization. This is because a given deviation from the
truth concerning the issuer's overall business situation relates to a
larger underlying future cash flow, and so the misstatement will lead
the market to overestimate the size of this future cash flow by a greater
absolute amount. Similarly, the social harm caused by the misstatement
would be greater because the larger size of the enterprise would mean
that the misstatement's negative effect on the quality of the issuer's
corporate governance would result in the mismanagement of a greater
amount of assets.
Thus, these same two factors that enlarge the impact of a
misstatement on an issuer's capitalization-the extent to which the
misstatement deviates from the truth and the size of the issuer's
enterprise-each also increase the social harm caused by the
misstatement in terms of the social consequences of the resulting poorer
corporate governance.
(H) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DURATION AND SOCIAL HARM FROM POORER
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Similarly, for a given absolute dollar impact of a misstatement on
an issuer's market capitalization, the longer the period before the
market realizes the truth, the longer the misstatement is doing its
damage to the issuer's corporate governance and the greater the
accumulated social costs.
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(ll) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMPACT ON MARKET CAPITALIZATION AND
SOCIAL HARM FROM REDUCED LIQUIDITY
A similar story can be told with respect to liquidity. For an issuer
of a given size, a misstatement's absolute dollar effect on an issuer's
market capitalization is positively related to the extent to which the
misstatement deviates from the truth. A larger deviation from the truth
creates the possibility of greater information asymmetry between
traders in the issuer's shares since the insider traders know the true
situation. The market's experience of the misstatement, compared to an
experience with a misstatement that deviates less from the truth, is
likely to cause market makers to raise their bid/ask spreads more to
protect themselves from future such incidents. Thus, it will have a
more negative effect on liquidity and cause greater social harm.
Alternatively, the absolute dollar effect of the misstatement can be
larger as the result of a misstatement being a given deviation from the
truth, but concerning an issuer of a larger size. The increase in bid/ask
spread will therefore relate to shares with a larger aggregate economic
value and the decrease in liquidity will again be socially more harmful.
(IV) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DURATION AND SOCIAL HARM FROM
REDUCED LIQUIDITY
The longer the period before the truth comes out after a
misstatement is made, the more trades are potentially subject to the
resulting information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. For
any given dollar effect of a misstatement on an issuer's market
capitalization, the market's experience of the misstatement, compared
to an experience with a similar misstatement but where the truth comes
out sooner, is likely to cause market makers to raise their bid/ask
spreads more to protect themselves from future such incidents. This
greater reduction in liquidity again results in greater social cost.
Thus, as with a misstatement's negative corporate-governance
effects, two principal determinants of the size of damages in a
successful fraud-on-the-market lawsuit-the misstatement's impact on
market capitalization and duration-positively correlate with factors
determining the social costs resulting from the misstatement's negative
liquidity effects.
c. Calibrating the contingency-fee percentage
Civil fraud-on-the-market damage actions for mandatory disclosure
violations are generally brought by plaintiffs' class-action lawyers
seeking a percentage-of-damages-recovered contingency fee. This fee-
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award structure means that, given the correlation demonstrated above
between damages and the amount of social harm, the amount of
resources attracted to pursuing such actions will also be correlated with
the amount of social damage. In other words, cases where the
misstatement causes more social harm tend to be the ones that will
generate larger damage awards, which in turn will offer bigger payoffs
to plaintiffs' lawyers. Thus, under the current system, the amount of
resources devoted to private enforcement will on average be
proportional to the amount of social harm.
However, on average, the proportionality of enforcement
resources to social harm does not guarantee that the ratio is optimal.
The ratio is determined by the size of the prevailing contingency-fee
percentage. If, with the current prevailing percentage, more resources
on average are attracted to pursuing these actions than is socially
desirable for a given amount of social harm, the ratio is too high and
the fee percentage should be adjusted downward. If the opposite is the
case, the ratio is too low and the fee percentage should be adjusted
upward. After any such needed adjustment, the amount of resources
devoted to private enforcement will, on average, not only be
proportional to the social harm caused by the misstatement, it would be
at a socially optimal ratio.
One further refinement of the contingency-fee formula would be
desirable. The discussion so far has been in terms of designing a
formula that attracts the socially optimal amount of private enforcement
resources on average. Any particular case can still attract too many or
too few resources because, even with the redesign suggested by the
discussion so far, there is not a one-to-one relation between the measure
of damages in each individual fraud-on-the-market lawsuit and social
harm, only a one-to-one relation on average. The primary reason that
individual suits deviate from the average is that the rate of turnover of
an issuer's shares during the period before the market realizes the truth
differs from one issuer to another: the higher the rate of turnover
during this period, the greater the damages. Yet, turnover has no
obvious relation to the social harm arising from a misstatement's
damage to corporate governance, and not an entirely clear relation to
the social harm arising from a misstatement's damage to liquidity. 8
38. It is difficult to conjure up a relationship between the rate of turnover and
the damage a misstatement makes to an issuer's corporate governance, at least in the
case of larger issuers that are reasonably thickly traded. An exception applies, perhaps,
in the case of an issuer whose turnover is sufficiently low that relevant actors put less
faith in the informativeness of its share price as a predictor of its future distributions to
shareholders discounted to present value. With such an issuer, price-related market
mechanisms for controlling the agency costs of management are less effective in any
event, and so the inaccuracies introduced by the misstatement would be less important.
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Thus, a contingency-fee formula that is furthermore redesigned so as to
reduce the fee percentage in cases with unusually high rates of turnover
and to increase it in cases with unusually low ones would likely more
closely match the amount of resources devoted to enforcement with
social harm.
C. Private Litigation as a "User Fee"
A second response to the critique of the insufficient public-agency-
budget rationale for allowing civil damage actions in the case of
mandatory disclosure violations is to regard the costs imposed on
investors arising from private securities litigation as roughly equivalent
to a governmentally imposed "user fee." These costs would include the
attorneys' fees for plaintiffs and for the issuer, experts' fees, executive
time and attention, and the securities-damages-related portion of the
administrative costs of D&O insurance, all of which will ultimately be
borne by corporate investors as a class. These costs would not include
any compensation received by investors for secondary market trading
losses from purchasing inflated shares, because such compensation is
simply a chance wealth distribution among investors.
Under this view, underfinancing public enforcement of mandatory
disclosure rules is not a public decision to have a low total level of
enforcement. Rather, it is a decision to rely on plaintiffs' lawyers to
supplement public enforcers through an arrangement by which the
segment of the population that benefits most from disclosure-
compliance-induced improved corporate governance and liquidity-
Liquidity is more complex and so it is harder to dismiss the possibility of a
relationship between turnover and social damage. A higher rate of turnover during the
period that the misstatement affects price would suggest a higher rate of turnover more
generally, and so the experience of the misstatement would have an effect thereafter on
the bid/ask spread with regard to a larger volume of transactions. This might suggest
more social damage. The effect of a bid/ask spread with regard to transactions that
actually occur is purely a wealth transfer, however, and so a higher volume of
transactions could merely mean more wealth would be transferred. The primary social
harm from lower liquidity comes from the situations when a buyer or seller would wish
to transact but for the unfavorable impact of the bid/ask price on the price he would
have paid or received. Consider two issuers, X and Y, with the same increase in their
respective bid/ask spreads due to a misstatement, but X has a higher rate of turnover
than Y. If the higher turnover rate of X is the result of buyers and sellers rationally
having reasons more often to want to buy and sell X's shares, the increase in the
bid/ask spread is going to block more such sales and purchases, and in the process do
more social harm. If the higher turnover in X is due to some kind of irrational frenzy,
it would not. For a discussion of reasons why different issuers might have different
rates of turnover, see Andrew W. Lo & Jiang Wang, Stock Market Trading Volume
(Sept. 5, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://home.uchicago.edu/
- lhansen/vol4-4.pdf.
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investors in publicly traded equities-will ultimately pay much of the
costs of this enforcement. Focusing the costs of a public regulation on
the segment that most benefits is perfectly sound public finance.
D. Legislative "Hands Tying" and Political Pressures on
Administrative Agencies
The decision by a legislature to pass regulatory legislation that
includes, explicitly or implicitly, a provision for civil liability can be
viewed as a kind of "hands tying" exercise. The supposition behind this
rationale is that the political actors who initially implement the rule fear
that special interests who oppose the regulations will be able to more
easily prevail later on and keep the budget low, thereby undermining
the intended impact of the rule. As a result, they create a device, civil
liability, that provides alternative social resources for enforcement
should their fears prove correct.39
A related concern is a fear that administrative officials might fail
to prosecute apparently worthwhile individual cases because of pressure
from wealthy or powerful individuals who would be negatively
affected. Civil liability, by providing an alternative avenue of
enforcement, provides resources in cases where the legislature would
want enforcement but where the responsible governmental agency does
not act. 4 By providing this alternative, private enforcement can
enhance the "rule of law," something that might be particularly
important in countries where government administrators are prone to
corruption or to the politicized application of justice, but where the
judiciary is regarded as less subject to such pressures.
IV. CIVIL LIABILITY AS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT
There are several additional justifications for civil liability for
mandatory disclosure violations that are independent of the private-
attorney-general rationale. The first of these alternative justifications
begins with questioning whether it is right to regard civil liability as the
substitute for public enforcement, rather than the other way around.
Public regulation of issuer disclosure is not necessarily transformative
in its consequences. As discussed above, private parties, through
39. A future legislature could of course reverse this decision by passing
legislation eliminating the private cause of action. Opponents of the regulations,
however, would require more strength to effect such a change in law than simply to
keep the enforcement budget low.
40. Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 32-33 (2002); Jill
E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 169 (1997).
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ordinary contracting, would have otherwise come to substitute
arrangements. While, because of market failure, such private
arrangements would have led to a suboptimally low level of issuer
disclosure, they would have still resulted in a significant portion of the
disclosure that mandatory disclosure provides.
If there were no mandatory disclosure, the private arrangements
that would have arisen instead would have been entirely enforced by
civil damage actions. Private enforcement of private arrangements is
the norm in our legal system; when people have their privately defined
rights invaded, they are the best judges of whether it is worth pursuing
a remedy.
Public enforcement is only needed when there is some kind of
enforcement-market failure. Because of externalities, a system relying
exclusively on privately enforced private contractual arrangements
would not provide sufficient incentives for issuer managers to disclose
at the socially optimal level. Still, a considerable portion of the needed
incentives can come from private suits. The rest can come from public
enforcement. Under this view, the public-enforcement budget is making
up for a shortfall of private enforcement, not private enforcement
making up for a shortfall in the public-enforcement budget.41
V. CIVIL LIABILITY AS GOVERNMENT OUTSOURCING
Allowing civil liability means that some portion of the total societal
resources devoted to the enforcement of disclosure rules goes to private
plaintiffs' law firms instead of to a public enforcement agency. Relying
at least in part on private firms has certain advantages. Organizational
economics suggests that organizations devoted to any particular task
have an optimal size that involves a tradeoff between economies of
scale and scope on the one hand, and the managerial-incentive problems
that tend to grow with firm size on the other.42 Where all enforcement
is concentrated in a single governmental agency, the resulting
41. There is in fact evidence that, for issuers below a certain size, almost all
enforcement action is brought by the SEC. See Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration:
Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 588-99 (1997).
These are cases where the expected damage award is too small to make the private
costs of bringing suit worthwhile. Id. at 588. However, the deterrence value of the
public actions, which private parties cannot capture, may well justify the resources
devoted by the SEC. See also Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private
Enforcement." The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L.
REv. 93, 109 (2005) (commenting that the delegation of enforcement to private parties
allows an agency's "scarce resources to [be put toward] detecting and prosecuting ...
violations where private plaintiffs lack sufficient incentives").




organization may be much larger than this optimal size and thus will
suffer diseconomies of scale.43 If so, it would be more efficient to
divide the work among a number of entities, each of which would be
closer to this optimal size. Arguably, this is exactly what happens when
a substantial portion of enforcement activities are undertaken by private
plaintiffs' firms. Private firms also compete and therefore are not
subject to the risk of becoming a "lazy monopolist" in the way a single
government enforcement agency is.'
A private firm may also, as a general matter, more efficiently
provide incentives for its agents than a government bureaucracy.45 This
advantage may be counterbalanced, however, by the idealism that
motivates some government enforcers. The orientation of such
governmental officials may also make them more attuned to steering
resources to the cases that are most likely to serve public purposes,
whereas private firms are more rigidly guided by whatever the fee
formula, combined with expected damages, suggests would maximize
net revenues.
According to the outsourcing rationale, allowing civil liability is
not an end run around a legislative decision to devote a smaller amount
of resources to enforcement. Rather, the aggregate amount of society's
resources going into enforcement is satisfactory to the legislature, but,
through the provision of court-approved plaintiffs' class-action
attorneys' fees, a portion of these resources are given to parties that
will arguably use them more efficiently than would public-enforcement
officials.' 6
VI. PROMOTING LEGAL INNOVATION
Compared to relying entirely on public enforcement, civil liability
will result in multiple entities, each with its own organizational culture
and incentive structure, bringing enforcement suits. Multiple entities
43. Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private
Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1193, 1298 (1982).
44. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen
Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 185, 199 (opining that citizen suits under the
environmental laws combat the tendency of a public enforcement agency to display the
pathologies of monopoly).
45. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General. Why the
Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215, 224
(1983).
46. Even if outsourcing is desirable, it is not obvious that the current method
by which private firms obtain their portion of these enforcement resources is the most
efficient. To the extent that outsourcing is the rationale for civil liability, it is fair to ask
why the government should not hire the finms or perhaps even auction the right to
pursue claims.
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provide multiple sources of initiative to come up with original legal
arguments.47 Some of these arguments will resonate with judges and
become precedent. Thus, civil liability promotes innovation in the law
and adaptation of the law to changing circumstances. g"
A comparison between the United States and Japan may provide an
example. The two countries share an almost identical securities-law
statutory framework, yet, in significant part because of judicial
lawmaking, securities law has developed far more in the United States
in terms of providing authority as to whether particular behaviors
violate the law.49 Many of the precedents that constitute this authority
have arisen out of private litigation. 50 In Japan, where there has been
little private litigation, there are far fewer such precedents.
CONCLUSION
Critics have attacked the fraud-on-the-market class-action lawsuit
brought by secondary-market investors for losses based on an issuer's
violation of periodic mandatory disclosure requirements when the issuer
has not traded. These critics have argued that the compensatory
justification for such actions is illusory. This criticism appears valid,
especially given the substantial social costs that such litigation involves.
It ignores, however, the other potential function of civil liability:
deterrence.
A deterrence justification for civil liability depends on finding the
alternative social mechanisms to attain public-regulation compliance-
governmentally imposed administrative and criminal sanctions-
insufficient. In the case of securities disclosure regulation, the usual
justification of civil liability is that allowing private plaintiffs to bring
civil suits creates a body of private attorney generals who help society
by supplementing the efforts of otherwise overstretched public
enforcement officials. This argument is too simple absent further
elaboration, because it is not self-evident that there is something
47. Stephenson, supra note 41, at 112-13; Thompson, supra note 44, at 199.
48. The downside to this innovation is the inconsistencies and incoherence that
can develop from a hydra-headed authority, such as the courts, making rules as opposed
to a single specialized agency. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority to Define
the Scope of Private Rights of Action, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1996).
49. See Alan L. Beller et al., Looks Can Be Deceiving-A Comparison of
Initial Public Offering Procedures Under Japanese and U S. Securities Laws, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1992); George F. Parker, The Regulation of Insider Trading in
Japan: Introducing a Private Right of Action, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1399 (1995).
50. A similar contrast between the United States and Japan, attributable to the
difference in the prevalence of private actions, has been noted with respect to the
antitrust laws. Harry First, Antitrust Enforcement in Japan, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 137,
179-80 (1995).
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inappropriate in less than total enforcement of a rule when this shortfall
occurs as a result of a political process that gives the enforcement
agency a budgetary allocation smaller than what would be needed for
full enforcement.
Responses to this challenge to the private-attorney-general
rationale include the idea that a properly designed civil-liability scheme
need not result in a greater than optimal level of enforcement. Also, a
legislature might want to include private enforcement as an indirect way
of charging a user fee on those who benefit the most from the
regulation. In addition, civil liability may be a safeguard provided by a
legislature against inappropriately low future budgetary allocations for
enforcement that it knows are likely because of expected special-interest
pressure or against a politicized or corrupted administrative
enforcement body.
There are also other reasons for having civil enforcement besides
supplementing public enforcement. Under one view, private litigation
can be justified as the natural primary enforcement mechanism, with
public enforcement being the supplement. Another view is that civil
liability constitutes an outsourcing to private agents of work the
government wants accomplished. Finally, civil liability may be needed
to promote socially useful legal innovation.
The case for retaining civil liability would be strongest if the
underlying cause of action were reformed in a way that, as I have
proposed elsewhere, explicitly recognizes the primacy of its deterrence
function. Fraud-on-the-market actions against the issuer would be
eliminated. Liability would instead be focused on corporate officers and
directors and on some kind of outside external certifier of an issuer's
periodic disclosure reports. Damages would be paid to the issuer, not to
investors who suffer trading losses.
Absent such a broad reform, however, it would be better not to
eliminate issuer fraud-on-the-market liability. Despite the weakness of
its compensatory justification, the cause of action serves important
deterrence functions that are unlikely to be equally well performed by
public enforcement alone. If it can be shown that the fraud-on-the-
market cause of action is resulting in overenforcement of mandatory
disclosure rules, the better response is a recalibration of the class-action
plaintiffs' lawyer contingent-fee structure, not elimination of the cause
of action altogether with nothing in its place.
